



Gojek Indonesia's Social Entrepreneurship Model: Economic Inclusion, Partner Protection, and Hybrid Digital Platform Governance

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Abstract

Background: The digital economic transformation has given rise to platform-based businesses that combine commercial objectives with social value creation through employment opportunities and economic inclusion.

Objective: To examine Gojek's hybrid value creation, the relationship between inclusion and welfare risks, the role of governance in partner protection, and a model of sustainable empowerment.

Methods: This qualitative case study draws on interviews with GoRide and GoCar drivers and central and DKI Jakarta transport officials. Thematic analysis relates participant accounts to regulations and recent literature. Deduction estimates remain self-reported.

Results: Employment access and urban connectivity coexist with reported operating costs, income uncertainty, protection gaps, and information asymmetry. Driver aspirations to establish businesses inform a proposed Inclusion-Protection-Transformation pathway. The commission-policy discussion identifies governance considerations without demonstrating improved welfare.

Conclusion: Gojek is interpreted as a commercial platform with hybrid social value creation, rather than formally classified as a social enterprise. The case-derived Sustainable Hybrid Platform Social Entrepreneurship Model connects inclusion, protection, transparency, collaborative governance, and prospective entrepreneurial mobility. Comparative and longitudinal validation is required.

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INTRODUCTION

Digital transformation has reshaped the structure of the labor market through the rise of digital labor platforms, which connect service providers with consumers via app-based technology. These platforms function not merely as transaction intermediaries but also create a new economic ecosystem that influences work patterns, population mobility, income distribution, and the relationships among workers, companies, consumers, and the government. A systematic review of this literature confirms that digital platforms simultaneously expand employment opportunities and expose workers to algorithmic control, competitive pressure, and downward wage pressure, underscoring the dual-edged nature of platform-based work worldwide (Alauddin et al., 2025).

In Indonesia, PT Gojek Indonesia serves as a significant example of this development. The Gojek platform enables people to utilize assets they already own — particularly motor vehicles and smartphones — to gain access to markets and sources of income. These characteristics make Gojek a relevant subject for analysis through the lenses of social entrepreneurship and hybrid

organizations. This pattern mirrors a broader dynamic observed in other developing economies, where digital platforms extend market access and formalization opportunities to informal-sector workers, albeit unevenly and with limited institutional support (Daramola & Etim, 2022). The analytical focus is whether commercial participation creates social opportunities and how governance supports or constrains their distribution. This lens permits examination of social value, inclusion, and empowerment without assuming a formally prioritized social mission.

Hybrid organizations combine commercial and social orientations in value creation. Hagedoorn et al. (2023) demonstrate that both commercial and social orientations can be positively associated with a hybrid organization's capacity to generate social innovation. Meanwhile, Doherty and Kittipanya-Ngam (2021) and Kramarenko and Kvitka (2023) emphasize the ability of hybrid business models to create both economic and social value through inclusive market mechanisms. In the context of the digital economy, platforms can serve as instruments that expand resources, networks, participation, and economic empowerment (Chandna, 2022; Pratono et al., 2023).

This perspective is relevant to Gojek because the platform's commercial activities operate alongside a social function: expanding public access to employment and sources of income. Research interviews indicate that the appeal of the Gojek model lies partly in its low barriers to entry, as the work is accessible to people with diverse educational backgrounds, ages, and social characteristics. However, informants also highlighted issues regarding reduced earnings, fuel costs, health concerns, and household expenses that must be covered by the income earned as driver-partners.

This situation illustrates an inclusion-vulnerability paradox: access to platform work does not necessarily provide a stable or protected livelihood. Muhyiddin et al. (2024) identify ambiguity in the employment relationship, while Izzati and Kwang (2025) examine legal options for addressing dependency and asymmetry. What remains unresolved in this literature is how employment access, partner protection, and platform governance connect to drivers' prospects for economic mobility within the same case. This study addresses that bounded gap by relating driver accounts to central and local government perspectives, distinguishing reported experiences from regulatory interpretation and a proposed empowerment pathway.

Regulatory developments in 2026 provide an important institutional context for examining the distribution of economic value within Indonesia's platform-based transportation sector. A maximum platform service fee of 8 percent was introduced for app-based two-wheeled passenger transportation services, with implementation commencing on July 1, 2026. This arrangement was subsequently reinforced within the broader regulatory framework of Presidential Regulation Number 27 of 2026 concerning the Protection of the Digital Platform-Based Transportation Ecosystem. These developments reflect government efforts to strengthen platform accountability and partner protection. Nevertheless, the introduction of a commission ceiling does not, by itself, establish improvements in drivers' net earnings, which also depend on operating expenses, other applicable charges, and the transparency of transaction information.

This shift is significant from a social entrepreneurship perspective, as it demonstrates that the balance between commercial value and social value cannot be left entirely to market mechanisms. The government acts as an institutional actor, balancing the sustainability of the platform business with the economic protection of its partners.

Based on these issues, this study aims to: (1) analyze Gojek's hybrid social-value-generating characteristics using driver and government accounts of employment and mobility; (2) examine inclusion and welfare risks through drivers' accounts of income, costs, and protection; (3) interpret value distribution and partner protection through government interviews and regulatory documents, including the 8 percent commission cap; and (4) develop a case-derived conceptual model by relating these themes to drivers' entrepreneurial aspirations. These sources correspond, respectively, to the findings on hybrid value creation, the inclusion-vulnerability paradox, platform governance, and transformative empowerment.

METHOD

This study employed a descriptive qualitative case study design to examine the relationships among economic inclusion, partner protection, and digital platform governance within Gojek's partnership ecosystem in DKI Jakarta, Indonesia. The analysis drew on reported

experiences of GoRide and GoCar driver-partners, perspectives from central and local transportation authorities, and relevant regulatory and scholarly documents. The case study approach enabled a contextual interpretation of how commercial platform activities intersected with perceived social value and livelihood vulnerability. The findings were interpreted within the boundaries of the available qualitative evidence and were not intended to establish causal policy effects or statistical generalizations about the broader population of platform workers.

Participants were selected purposively based on their direct involvement in Gojek's transportation and governance ecosystem. The participant categories comprised GoRide and GoCar driver-partners, officials from the Ministry of Transportation, and representatives of the DKI Jakarta Transportation Agency. Interviews with driver-partners provided accounts of access to employment opportunities, operating expenses, income uncertainty, and entrepreneurial aspirations, whereas interviews with government officials informed the analysis of regulatory arrangements, institutional responsibilities, and transportation governance. An interview with a Ministry of Transportation official was conducted on July 1, 2026. The available research documentation did not establish the total number of participants, the distribution of participants across categories, interview durations, recruitment procedures, or the complete data collection period. Consequently, the study did not claim thematic saturation, sample representativeness, or systematic comparisons between participant groups.

Secondary data consisted of laws and regulations, government policies, institutional documents, and scholarly literature published or issued during the 2021–2026 period. The regulations analyzed included Law Number 22 of 2009 concerning Road Traffic and Transportation, Ministry of Transportation Regulation Number 12 of 2019, and Ministry of Transportation Decree Number 667 of 2022, including its amendments, as well as policy developments concerning the protection of online transportation workers in 2026 ([Airlangga & Suryokencono, 2024](#); [Peraturan Menteri Perhubungan Republik Indonesia Nomor PM 12 Tahun 2019 Tentang Pelindungan Keselamatan Pengguna Sepeda Motor Yang Digunakan Untuk Kepentingan Masyarakat, 2019](#); [Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 22 Tahun 2009 Tentang Lalu Lintas Dan Angkutan Jalan, 2009](#)).

The qualitative material was interpreted through thematic analysis involving data reduction, thematic categorization, comparison, and synthesis. The analysis organized the reported findings into themes concerning employment and economic inclusion, operating costs and livelihood vulnerability, occupational protection, regulatory responsibilities, information transparency, urban mobility, and entrepreneurial aspirations. These themes were examined in relation to the study's four research objectives and the relevant literature on social entrepreneurship and platform governance. The conceptual relationships among these themes informed the proposed Sustainable Hybrid Platform Social Entrepreneurship Model. Because detailed coding records and complete interview transcripts were unavailable for independent assessment, the thematic structure was presented as an interpretive synthesis rather than as a fully auditable account of transcript-level coding procedures.

Source triangulation was undertaken by comparing the reported perspectives of driver-partners, Ministry of Transportation officials, and DKI Jakarta Transportation Agency representatives, while regulatory documents and scholarly literature were used to contextualize the interpretation. Driver-partner accounts primarily informed the analysis of livelihood experiences and entrepreneurial aspirations, whereas government perspectives informed the interpretation of regulatory responsibilities and transportation governance. Convergences and differences among these sources were considered in developing the case-based conceptual framework. This approach provided contextual support for the interpretation but did not independently verify individual transaction estimates, demonstrate policy compliance, or constitute methodological triangulation involving multiple primary data collection techniques.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Gojek as a Hybrid Digital Platform-Based Social Entrepreneurship Model

Research findings indicate that Gojek can be understood as a platform ecosystem that brings together the creation of commercial and social value.

Commercial value is generated through transactions, app usage, market expansion, and the development of a service ecosystem. Meanwhile, social value is created through the generation

of income opportunities, improved transportation accessibility, the digitalization of society, and the connection of consumers with various service providers.




Figure 1. Conceptual Interpretation of Hybrid Digital Platform-Based Social Entrepreneurship

This characteristic aligns with the concept of a hybrid organization that integrates commercial and social orientations (Hagedoorn et al., 2023). Digitalization also enables social enterprises to expand their networks and foster forms of empowerment that were previously difficult to achieve through conventional mechanisms (Pratono et al., 2023). At the same time, recent research on hybrid organizations cautions that digitalization is not a neutral process: it can destabilize the existing balance between commercial and social logics and generate internal tensions that must be actively managed rather than assumed away (Hu et al., 2026).

However, hybridity gives rise to tension when the platform's profitability interests conflict with the well-being of its partners. Consequently, in this study, Gojek is not normatively classified as a formal "social enterprise"; instead, it is analyzed as a business platform characterized by hybrid social value creation.

Economic Inclusion and Employment Opportunity Expansion

The findings reveal that one of the platform's strengths is the low barrier to entry for engaging in productive economic activities. In interviews with the Ministry of Transportation, the study noted that platform work is viewed as attractive because it does not impose significant restrictions based on education, age, or gender. This is consistent with national-level typology studies, which show that the transportation segment constitutes the largest and most accessible entry point into Indonesia's gig economy precisely because it demands comparatively few formal qualifications (Permana et al., 2022).

This situation demonstrates a function of employment inclusion: individuals can transform assets they already possess such as vehicles, smartphones, time, and labor into means of generating income.

However, the study distinguishes between two forms of inclusion: (2) Employment Inclusion access to obtaining employment; and (2) Sustainable Economic Inclusion employment that provides a secure livelihood while enabling economic mobility.

This distinction is important because platform flexibility does not automatically result in economic security. Recent studies on ride-hailing workers have also found a combination of work flexibility, income instability, and limited social protection (Putra et al., 2025). A panel-data analysis of gig workers' wages across Indonesian provinces similarly finds that macro-level conditions, such as inflation and regional digital readiness, shape the earnings gig workers actually realize, reinforcing the point that access to platform work does not by itself guarantee a secure income (Zareka et al., 2025).

The Inclusion-Vulnerability Paradox

The research findings reveal an "inclusion-vulnerability paradox": while platforms provide access to work, drivers individually bear a portion of the economic risk.

Driver accounts describe personally supplied vehicles and expenses for fuel, maintenance, mobile data, and working time. Gross transaction revenue therefore differs from household take-home income. This reported cost burden is consistent with Rachmawati et al. (2021) and Permana (2026) account of Indonesian online motorcycle-taxi drivers during COVID-19, without establishing identical costs across drivers or periods.

A GoCar driver estimated in an interview that total deductions from a transaction could approach or exceed one quarter of its value. This is a self-reported estimate, not an audited commission rate, a sample-wide earnings measure, or evidence that a two-wheeled service regulation applies to GoCar.

These estimates reflect participants' calculations rather than audited transactions or evidence of systematic regulatory breaches. Application fees must be distinguished from other charges and operating expenses before compliance or net earnings can be assessed.

The accounts indicate a perceived transparency gap between transaction components, regulatory limits, and drivers' understanding of net earnings. Putri and Heeks (2023) similarly identify decent-work concerns in Indonesia's gig economy. This comparison contextualizes the case without independently verifying its reported deductions.

The Maximum 8% Commission Policy and Redistribution of Platform Economic Value

The introduction of a maximum 8 percent platform service fee for app-based two-wheeled passenger transportation on July 1, 2026, represents an important regulatory development in the distribution of economic value between platform companies and driver-partners. The policy provides an institutional basis for examining commission arrangements, although its effects on drivers' actual take-home income cannot be inferred from the prescribed percentage alone.

The Ministry of Transportation interview conducted on July 1, 2026, provides an institutional perspective on coordination and the initial implementation of the commission policy. However, this interview does not constitute independent evidence of platform-wide compliance or measurable improvements in driver welfare.

The regulatory context also includes Ministry of Transportation Decree Number KP 667 of 2022, as amended by KP 1001 of 2022, which previously provided guidance on service-fee calculations for app-based motorcycle transportation ([Keputusan Menteri Perhubungan Republik Indonesia Nomor KP 667 Tahun 2022 Tentang Pedoman Perhitungan Biaya Jasa Penggunaan Sepeda Motor Yang Digunakan Untuk Kepentingan Masyarakat Yang Dilakukan Dengan Aplikasi, 2022](#)). Subsequent regulatory developments in 2026 introduced the maximum 8 percent platform service fee and incorporated the arrangement into the broader governance framework established by Presidential Regulation Number 27 of 2026 ([Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 27 Tahun 2026 Tentang Pelindungan Ekosistem Transportasi Berbasis Platform Digital, 2026](#)).

From a social entrepreneurship perspective, these regulatory developments may be interpreted as institutional efforts to address imbalances in economic value distribution. Nevertheless, their effectiveness depends on the distinction between platform service fees, other transaction-related charges, and drivers' operating expenses. Verified transaction records and longitudinal income data would be required to determine whether the policy produces sustained improvements in drivers' economic welfare.

Conceptual view before the policy




Figure 2. Conceptual Interpretation of the Governance Shift Associated with the 8% Commission Policy

From a social entrepreneurship perspective, the commission cap can be interpreted as an attempt to improve distributive fairness between technology providers and partners supplying labor and productive assets. This is an analytical interpretation of the policy's design, not an observed improvement in driver welfare.

The policy also demonstrates that market mechanisms alone do not necessarily yield an optimal balance between platform profitability and partner well-being. The government thus acts as an institutional balancing actor:

Commercial Interest ↔ Government Regulation ↔ Driver Welfare

The commission cap may be an important but insufficient component of partner protection. Its practical contribution depends on transparent transaction components, oversight, and other costs affecting net earnings. The interviews do not establish whether the policy increased take-home income; evaluating that outcome requires verified earnings and cost records over time.

Partner Status and Regulatory Gaps

Interviews with the DKI Jakarta Transportation Agency highlight the governance implications of classifying app-based transportation companies as platform providers and drivers as independent partners rather than conventional employees. This relationship is generally structured around interactions among the platform, driver-partners, and consumers. Previous legal scholarship has identified potential protection and bargaining challenges arising from this partnership arrangement (Saputra, 2022). Presidential Regulation Number 27 of 2026 provides a more explicit regulatory framework for platform partnerships, including provisions concerning partnership agreements and related protections. Nevertheless, the existence of formal regulatory provisions does not establish their effective implementation or resolve all questions concerning workers' bargaining power, economic dependency, and access to employment-related protection.

The issue is increasingly complex regarding two-wheeled transport services. While Law Number 22 of 2009 concerning Road Traffic and Transportation serves as the overarching legislation for road transport, categorizing app-based motorcycle services as public transport is not as straightforward as classifying conventional public transport modes.

Consequently, the government issued Ministry of Transportation Regulation Number 12 of 2019 concerning Safety Protection for Motorcycle Users in Public Service a regulation primarily focused on safety aspects .

Findings from the Transportation Agency indicate that the presence of app-based motorcycle taxis creates a dilemma: the public relies on them, yet their legal classification does not fully align with that of conventional public transport.

This gap is also highlighted in research by Muhyiddin et al. (2024), which concludes that gig economy employment relationships in Indonesia remain ambiguous. Izzati and Kwang (2025) further argue that the conventional partnership framework is not entirely suited to platform-based relationships, which are characterized by asymmetry and dependency. This implies that regulatory evolution must shift from mere "transportation regulation" toward "platform worker governance."

Social Protection as a Dimension of Social Entrepreneurship

Driver well-being cannot be assessed solely on the basis of income. Protection against accidents, health issues, income loss, and occupational risks is also integral to the platform's social sustainability. National-level data confirm that this concern extends well beyond Gojek's driver-partners: informal workers as a whole remain dramatically underrepresented in Indonesia's labor social security scheme, with formal workers many times more likely to be enrolled than their informal counterparts (Ngadi et al., 2025).

Silaban et al. (2023) emphasize that enhancing protection for platform transport workers requires clarity regarding their employment status and forms of protection tailored to the nature of the work. Muhyiddin et al. (2024) also find that the ambiguity of the employment relationship is closely linked to the limited protection automatically afforded to drivers.

Izzati and Kwang (2025) indicate that Indonesia's reform options could focus on establishing a specific category for platform work, redefining the employment relationship, or implementing incremental protection through technical regulations.

Thus, Gojek's social sustainability needs to be assessed on the basis of Income + Safety + Social Security + Economic Mobility, and not merely the Number of Drivers + Number of Transactions.

Data Transparency and Platform Governance

The Ministry of Transportation interview identifies access to platform-held driver and transaction information as an important governance concern. According to the institutional account, limited access to such information may constrain regulatory oversight and the assessment of platform activities. This concern is relevant to broader discussions of information asymmetry in algorithmically managed platform work ([Kadolkar et al., 2025](#)). In the present case, however, the interviews do not independently establish the extent of data withholding or demonstrate specific violations of disclosure obligations. Rather, the findings underscore the importance of transparent transaction information, proportionate regulatory data access, and mechanisms that enable relevant authorities and driver-partners to distinguish platform service fees from other charges and operating expenses.

This issue highlights the existence of information asymmetry: the platform possesses data on transactions and partner activities, whereas the government and drivers have more limited access. A systematic review of algorithmic management in the gig economy similarly identifies opacity as a defining feature of platform governance: the inner workings of pricing, matching, and rating algorithms remain largely unknown even to the workers whose earnings they determine ([Kadolkar et al., 2025](#)).

Data asymmetry affects the government's ability to determine the number of active partners, supply-demand patterns, earnings, working hours, safety, and the effectiveness of regulatory implementation.

Transaction transparency is particularly relevant to evaluating the 8 percent policy: regulators and drivers need to distinguish application fees, other charges, operating expenses, and net income before assessing compliance or welfare effects. This study identifies that verification need without auditing platform records. Algorithmic control can also contribute to driver strain, reinforcing the relevance of transparent pricing and performance decisions ([Cram & Benlian, 2022](#)).

Fragmentation of Authority and Collaborative Governance

The governance of platform-based transportation involves multiple public institutions whose responsibilities extend across transportation services, digital systems, partnership arrangements, and social protection. The Ministry of Transportation interview highlights the importance of inter-agency coordination, while the regulatory developments under Presidential Regulation Number 27 of 2026 provide a broader institutional framework for organizing these responsibilities. Within this framework, transportation service regulation, digital platform oversight, and partnership governance involve different government authorities. The resulting governance challenge is therefore not merely the existence of multiple regulations, but the need to coordinate institutional mandates and establish transparent mechanisms for implementation, supervision, and driver-partner protection. Its governance structure can be summarized as follows:

- 1) Ministry of Transportation: passenger transportation regulation, relevant service-fee arrangements, and transportation safety.
- 2) Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs: digital systems and regulatory responsibilities concerning platform-based goods and food delivery services.
- 3) Ministry of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises: governance and coordination of platform partnership arrangements.
- 4) Ministry of Manpower and relevant social security institutions: labor-related protection considerations and social security administration within their respective mandates.
- 5) Local governments and transportation agencies: regional transportation coordination and operational oversight within their authority.
- 6) Platform companies: implementation of applicable platform regulations, transaction transparency, and partnership obligations.
- 7) Driver-partner communities: representation of drivers' experiences, concerns, and collective

interests.

This model requires collaborative governance because no single actor possesses all the resources and authority needed to resolve platform-related issues independently. Comparative evidence from Southeast Asia shows that the configuration of legal classification, social protection, platform accountability, and worker representation, rather than any single instrument, is what ultimately determines whether platform governance functions coherently or remains fragmented (Giang, 2026).

Gojek as First-Mile and Last-Mile Urban Mobility

Gojek's potential social value is not limited to employment access. Informants from the DKI Jakarta Transportation Agency (Dishub) described gaps in first-mile and last-mile public transportation. Online motorcycle taxis can connect homes with stations and transport nodes with final destinations.

This shows that there is a Mobility Social Value in addition to an Employment Social Value. Gojek helps fill the connectivity gap that public transportation has not yet fully addressed. Survey-based evidence from other Indonesian cities corroborates this pattern, finding that ride-hailing services are frequently used to bridge the first- and last-mile segments of intercity transit trips, particularly among younger, educated, and wealthier commuters (Widiastuti & Irawan, 2024).

The Ministry of Transportation's findings also acknowledge that online transportation contributes to community accessibility and opens up economic opportunities, although it simultaneously creates challenges for safety and integration with mass transportation.

The case therefore suggests two dimensions of platform social value: economic opportunity through employment and income access, and mobility value through accessibility and connectivity. Neither dimension alone establishes Gojek's formal classification as a social enterprise.

From Driver to Entrepreneur: Transformative Empowerment

The most significant finding in the context of social entrepreneurship stems from the aspirations of the drivers themselves.

One informant (a Gojek driver) stated that he did not wish to work as a ride-hailing driver forever. He plans to open a repair shop and hopes the business will eventually create jobs for others. He also hopes for access to financing with lower interest rates to make business loan installments more affordable.

Other drivers also expressed that financial support could offer partners hope for developing businesses beyond their ride-hailing work.

The entrepreneurial aspirations expressed by the interviewed drivers provide an empirical starting point for proposing a pathway beyond continued dependence on platform-based employment. Based on these accounts, the study conceptualizes a potential sequence linking platform participation, income-generating opportunities, livelihood protection, capital accumulation, access to productive financing, and the development of independent business activities. This sequence represents a proposed mechanism of transformative empowerment rather than an observed transition. The interviews identify drivers' intentions and perceived financing needs but do not establish whether the participants accumulated sufficient capital, obtained financing, established viable businesses, or subsequently created employment opportunities for others.

The proposed pathway distinguishes employment access from possible transformative empowerment. The literature on informal entrepreneurship provides a basis for examining transitions toward independent business activity (Salvi et al., 2023). However, this study does not establish that such transitions have occurred among the interviewed drivers.

The Sustainable Hybrid Platform Social Entrepreneurship Model

Table 1 proposes seven dimensions by consolidating the ten thematic subsections: hybrid value, governance, inclusion, risk distribution, regulation, collaboration, and prospective empowerment. Interview accounts inform these categories; their proposed relationships are interpretive and have not been causally validated.

Table 1*The Sustainable Hybrid Platform Social Entrepreneurship Model*

Dimension	Core Components
I. Hybrid Value Creation	Commercial Value (profitability, transactions, efficiency, market expansion) and Social Value (employment, income, accessibility, economic inclusion)
II. Digital Platform Governance	Algorithm, data, pricing, rating, matching, and partnership mechanisms
III. Economic and Mobility Inclusion	Employment access, income opportunity, and first-mile/last-mile accessibility
IV. Risk and Value Distribution	Income volatility, operational costs, occupational risk, information asymmetry, and social protection gaps
V. Government Regulatory Intervention	8% maximum commission, safety regulation, social protection, and data transparency requirements
VI. Collaborative Governance	Government, platform, driver communities, BPJS, and financial institutions
VII. Sustainable Empowerment	Proposed: Employment → Protection → Income Security → Capital → Entrepreneurship → Potential Job Creation and Welfare

The proposed Sustainable Hybrid Platform Social Entrepreneurship Model integrates seven interrelated analytical dimensions derived from the case findings. Hybrid value creation describes the coexistence of commercial activities and potential social benefits, while digital platform governance shapes the institutional and technological conditions under which economic and mobility inclusion occurs. Risk and value distribution highlights the livelihood uncertainties and protection concerns associated with participation in the platform ecosystem. Government regulatory intervention and collaborative governance are conceptualized as potential mechanisms for improving accountability and partner protection. Sustainable empowerment constitutes a prospective dimension through which protected economic participation may support capital development and entrepreneurial mobility. These relationships represent case-derived theoretical propositions and should not be interpreted as empirically established causal pathways or validated indicators of improved welfare.

Discussion***Gojek's Hybrid Character Revisited: Between Social Enterprise and Social-Value-Generating Business***

Accounts of employment access and urban connectivity are consistent with the coexistence of commercial activity and social value discussed by Hagedoorn et al. (2023) and Doherty and Kittipanya-Ngam (2021), Chandna (2022) and Pratono et al. (2023) likewise provide a basis for interpreting the role of digital platforms in economic participation. The present qualitative case identifies perceived social value rather than measuring its magnitude or proving a formal social-enterprise mandate.

The tension described in “Gojek as a Hybrid Digital Platform-Based Social Entrepreneurship Model” supports analyzing Gojek as a commercial platform with hybrid social value creation. The evidence does not establish whether social mission formally precedes, equals, or follows profit objectives. Accordingly, the study uses social entrepreneurship as an analytical lens for evaluating how commercial participation might support protection and empowerment, without assigning Gojek a formal social-enterprise classification.

Economic Inclusion and Welfare Risk: Explaining the Inclusion–Vulnerability Paradox

The second objective is addressed in “Economic Inclusion and Employment Opportunity Expansion” and “The Inclusion–Vulnerability Paradox.” Driver accounts describe employment access alongside operating costs and income uncertainty. These experiences are consistent with the ambiguity discussed by Muhyiddin et al. (2024) and the combination of flexibility and insecurity reported by Putra et al. (2025). They suggest coexistence within this case, without establishing that access itself causes vulnerability.

Distinguishing employment inclusion from sustainable economic inclusion separates access to work from livelihood security. This provides an analytical link between the dependency discussed by Izzati and Kwang (2025), the labor-protection concerns examined by Wibowo & Susanto (2025), and the drivers' own accounts. The distinction is a proposed evaluative framework rather than a claim that all prior studies use participation counts alone.

The deduction accounts in "The Inclusion–Vulnerability Paradox" also indicate a perceived information problem. Because transaction estimates were not independently verified, the case supports examining the gap between disclosed charges and drivers' understanding, but does not establish its monetary size or prevalence. Transparent records would be needed to distinguish information uncertainty from actual fee noncompliance.

The 8% Commission Policy as Institutional Correction, Not a Complete Solution

The commission-policy findings illustrate how government intervention may influence the institutional conditions of value distribution within a commercially operated digital platform. The maximum 8 percent platform service fee creates a regulatory benchmark for assessing relevant charges, but this benchmark does not directly indicate the level or stability of drivers' take-home income. In the present case, the accounts of operating expenses and uncertainty surrounding transaction deductions suggest that the relationship between regulatory limits and livelihood outcomes requires further empirical examination.

The contribution of this finding to the proposed model lies in distinguishing regulatory intervention from effective economic protection. A commission ceiling may address one component of platform-related deductions, whereas sustainable livelihood protection also depends on transaction transparency, operational costs, accessible protection mechanisms, and institutional oversight. Accordingly, the policy is interpreted as one component of a broader governance framework rather than a sufficient condition for improved driver welfare.

From Fragmented Protection to Collaborative Governance

The subsections "Partner Status and Regulatory Gaps," "Social Protection as a Dimension of Social Entrepreneurship," "Data Transparency and Platform Governance," and "Fragmentation of Authority and Collaborative Governance" identify overlapping institutional responsibilities. Read with Silaban et al. (2023) and Muhyiddin et al. (2024), these accounts suggest that employment ambiguity and fragmented authority may complicate protection across transportation, digital communications, manpower, social security, and local government. Their relative effects are not quantified.

Read together, these findings suggest that the appropriate policy response is not simply to add more sector-specific rules, but to shift toward what this study terms platform worker governance: a collaborative arrangement in which each institutional actor's mandate is explicitly linked to the others, rather than operating in parallel. This interpretation supports Izzati and Kwang (2025) proposal that Indonesia consider a distinct legal category for platform work rather than forcing it into either the employment or the conventional partnership box.

Beyond Inclusion: Transformation as the Distinguishing Feature of Social Entrepreneurship

The fourth objective is addressed in "From Driver to Entrepreneur: Transformative Empowerment" and the proposed Inclusion–Protection–Transformation pathway. Drivers' aspirations to establish businesses motivate considering entrepreneurial mobility alongside livelihood protection. These aspirations provide a basis for model development, not evidence of completed business transitions or subsequent job creation.

The conceptual contribution is to connect the protection concerns discussed by Muhyiddin et al. (2024), Izzati and Kwang (2025), and Wibowo and Susanto (2025) with a prospective entrepreneurial-mobility pathway. Inclusion, protection, and transformation are proposed as related evaluative dimensions. Whether protection enables capital accumulation and business formation, and under which conditions, remains a question for comparative and longitudinal research.

Limitations

This single-platform, single-metropolitan case supports contextual interpretation rather than statistical generalization. Deduction accounts are self-reported, and transaction records and longitudinal welfare measures were unavailable. The July 1, 2026 Ministry interview captures an early policy transition rather than sustained implementation outcomes. Participant counts, recruitment details, experience profiles, interview durations, and the full collection period are not documented in the manuscript; these reporting gaps constrain assessment of sample adequacy and saturation. Comparative and longitudinal studies using verified transaction and livelihood data are needed to evaluate the proposed model and policy implications.

Policy Implications

The findings suggest that platform-based transportation governance could benefit from an integrated approach extending beyond conventional transportation regulation. The coexistence of employment opportunities, operating-cost burdens, information asymmetry, and partner-protection concerns indicates the relevance of coordinating economic, technological, and social protection considerations. The following policy implications are derived from the qualitative findings and the regulatory context. They represent potential areas for institutional development rather than interventions whose effectiveness has been demonstrated by this case study.

First, implementation of the maximum 8 percent commission policy should be accompanied by transparent transaction statements distinguishing application fees, other charges, operating expenses, and net earnings. This would support independent compliance assessment; improved welfare cannot be inferred from the statutory rate alone. Second, a proportional data-sharing mechanism is needed between application companies and the government to support supervision, while still paying attention to the protection of personal data. Third, social protection needs to be designed based on the nature of platform work. The flexibility of the partnership relationship should not eliminate minimum protection against accidents and socio-economic risks. Fourth, ojol needs to be increasingly integrated with mass transportation policy as a provider of first-mile and last-mile connectivity, rather than positioned solely as a competitor to public transportation. Fifth, public institutions and relevant stakeholders could explore voluntary entrepreneurship-support programs for driver-partners interested in developing independent businesses. Potential forms of support include financial literacy, entrepreneurship training, access to appropriate productive financing, and assistance for micro, small, and medium enterprises. These recommendations reflect the entrepreneurial aspirations expressed in the interviews; their feasibility and effectiveness would require further evaluation before they could be considered established mechanisms of sustainable empowerment.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that PT Gojek Indonesia operates as a commercial digital platform with hybrid social value creation through employment opportunities, economic inclusion, and improved urban mobility. However, these contributions coexist with an inclusion-vulnerability paradox, as driver-partners face operating costs, income uncertainty, occupational risks, and limitations in social protection. The maximum 8 percent platform service fee policy represents a regulatory intervention intended to improve the distribution of economic value between platform companies and driver-partners. Nevertheless, its actual effects on drivers' net income remain unverified due to the absence of audited transaction records and longitudinal evidence. These findings emphasize the importance of transaction transparency, effective regulatory oversight, and collaborative governance in strengthening partner protection. Accordingly, Gojek is understood as a commercial platform generating potential social value rather than being formally classified as a social enterprise.

The study proposes the Sustainable Hybrid Platform Social Entrepreneurship Model, integrating hybrid value creation, economic and mobility inclusion, risk and value distribution, digital platform governance, regulatory intervention, collaborative governance, and sustainable empowerment. Through the proposed Inclusion-Protection-Transformation pathway, the model conceptualizes how employment access, livelihood protection, capital accumulation, and entrepreneurial opportunities may contribute to longer-term economic empowerment. However,

the model remains a conceptual proposition rather than an empirically validated framework, as the interviews document entrepreneurial aspirations without demonstrating completed business transitions or subsequent job creation. The study is also limited by its single-platform case design, incomplete participant documentation, and reliance on self-reported financial estimates. Future research should employ comparative and longitudinal approaches supported by verified income and transaction data to evaluate the proposed relationships and determine whether platform participation can contribute to sustainable livelihood security and entrepreneurial mobility.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

All authors contributed equally to the preparation of this article. Contributions included the conceptualization and design of the study, data collection through in-depth interviews with GoRide and GoCar driver-partners as well as officials from the Ministry of Transportation and the DKI Jakarta Transportation Agency, thematic analysis and triangulation of data with regulations and scholarly literature, development of the conceptual model, and the overall writing and editing of the manuscript. All authors have read, provided feedback on, and approved the final version of this article for publication.

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